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I. Introduction
Despite widespread improvements in the availability and stability of food sup-
plies, recent estimates suggest that there are still between 700 and 870 million
undernourished people in the world (Fan 2012; FAO 2012b; Meade and
Rosen 2013). Given the difﬁculties faced by many households in obtaining
adequate sustenance, considerable attention has been devoted to measuring
different aspects of malnourishment (FAO 2012a), analyzing methods to bet-
ter deliver food assistance (e.g., Barrett 2002), and estimating the effects of
food assistance on households (e.g., Behrman and Deolalikar 1988; Barrett
2002).
This article examines the effect of a large grains subsidy in India on nutri-
tion, where poor households purchase a ration of signiﬁcantly subsidized food
grains (primarily rice and wheat). We obtain information about the quantity
of foods consumed in each household from large consumer expenditure sur-
veys conducted by the government of India, and we map this to nutritional
outcomes using the average nutritional content of foods common to the In-
dian diet. The baseline speciﬁcations focus on the effect the grains subsidy
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56 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G EA high proportion of children and adults suffer from moderate to severe
grades of protein-calorie malnutrition, as observed in anthropometric indica-
tors (e.g., Indian Council on Medical Research 2009), and thus a higher con-
sumption of protein would unambiguously improve the health of the average
Indian household. Additionally, in a number of settings, nutrient consump-
tion is more responsive to economic shocks than energy consumption (e.g.,
Block et al. 2004; Brinkman et al. 2009). Thus, we focus on speciﬁcations
analyzing the consumption of a number of beneﬁcial nutrients. However, we
also estimate speciﬁcations that analyze total energy consumption.
The effect of in-kind food aid on nutrition is theoretically ambiguous. Pro-
vided households are inframarginal—the amount of in-kind aid is less than
what households actually consume—the effect of in-kind aid should be iden-
tical to an unconditional cash transfer. Households will increase their consump-
tion of more nutritious food items if they are normal goods. Alternatively, con-
sumption of these items could remain constant if households instead choose
to increase their consumption of nonfood goods or food items with less nu-
tritious content, such as processed foods (Behrman and Deolalikar 1989).
A number of studies suggest that food price subsidies have little effect on
nutrition in developing countries. Using experimental evidence from China,
Jensen and Miller (2011) ﬁnd little evidence of any nutritional response to
subsidizing staple foods. Rather, the authors ﬁnd some evidence that house-
holds substitute toward foods without better nutrition or nonfood goods.
Tarozzi (2005) examines a decrease in the food grains subsidy in the Indian
state of Andhra Pradesh and ﬁnds little evidence of an effect on the nutrition
of children younger than 4 years of age.1
The dietary effects of food price subsidies are particularly important in India.
India contains nearly 40% of the world’s food-insecure population (FAO
2012b). This is despite the fact that India spends nearly 1% of its GDP on
maintaining its food assistance program, the Public Distribution System (PDS;
Sharma 2012). This issue has become even more salient with the recent pas-
sage of the National Food Security Act (NFSA), which will dramatically ex-
pand the distribution of subsidized food grains in India. Despite this large pro-
jected increase in expenditure on food aid, previous research provides no
evidence that expanding the PDS in its current form will improve calorie con-1 Other studies of the effects of food price subsidies in developing countries on food consumption
include Gavan and Chandrasekera (1979), Alderman and von Braun (1984), Edirisinghe (1987),
Kennedy and Alderman (1987), and Alderman, Chaudhry, and Garcia (1988). These studies com-
pare participants with nonparticipants and cannot account for selection biases that prevent identiﬁ-
cation of the effects of such programs on nutrition.
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Krishnamurthy, Pathania, and Tandon 57sumption or diet quality in India (Tarozzi 2005; Kaushal and Muchomba
2013).
In order to estimate the nutritional effects of food price subsidies, we ex-
amine reforms to the PDS in the Indian state of Chhattisgarh that dramati-
cally expanded the availability of PDS food grains. Previous estimates show
that the distribution of subsidized food grains is highly inefﬁcient; approxi-
mately 54% of food grains did not reach their intended beneﬁciaries in
2004–5 (Dreze and Khera 2011). Chhattisgarh, however, tried to improve
the performance of the PDS following the formation of the state in 2000 and
instituted a number of reforms to the PDS that increased the state’s procure-
ment of PDS rice as well as the number of shops devoted to selling PDS ra-
tions. Following the reforms, state procurement of PDS rice and the number
of shops selling PDS commodities both increased dramatically between 1999–
2000 and 2004–5.
In contrast to Chhattisgarh, aside from the national reforms, there appear
to have been no major PDS reforms during the same time period in states that
border Chhattisgarh (Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maha-
rashtra, Odisha, and Uttar Pradesh). We exploit this difference by comparing
changes in diet choice in Chhattisgarh to changes in districts that border
Chhattisgarh between 1999–2000 and 2004–5. Just before its formation, av-
erage household consumption of PDS rice calories in Chhattisgarh was ap-
proximately one-third that of households in districts neighboring the state.
However, following the PDS reforms, the percentage of households consum-
ing PDS rice in Chhattisgarh nearly doubled from 10% to 19%, and the av-
erage amount consumed increased by more than 400%. In contrast, PDS con-
sumption in neighboring districts was essentially unchanged on average
during this period (Krishnamurthy, Pathania, and Tandon 2014).
In a previous article (Krishnamurthy et al. 2014) published in a widely cir-
culated news weekly, we presented a series of stylized facts that were intended
to inform the policy debate over the PDS in India. Chhattisgarh has been
lauded as an example of successful PDS reform, and most observers attribute
its perceived success in improving the PDS to initiatives taken by the Raman
Singh government after 2004 (Puri 2012). However, we documented the fact
that PDS rice consumption inChhattisgarh rose before 2004 in response to ear-
lier reforms and that PDS consumption growth in Chhattisgarh after 2004 is
comparable to neighboring regions. In this article, we attempt to comprehen-
sively analyze the nutritional effects of reforms undertaken in Chhattisgarh
between 1999–2000 and 2004–5. Our analysis stops before the onset of the
global food price spike of 2007, which likely affected PDS consumption and
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58 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G EWe ﬁnd signiﬁcant dietary changes in Chhattisgarh relative to border dis-
tricts as the availability of PDS rice expanded between 1999–2000 and 2004–
5. Households in the state increased their consumption of protein and a number
of other beneﬁcial nutrients relative to border districts. Growth in protein con-
sumption was approximately 17.8% higher for households in Chhattisgarh.2
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the growth in protein consumption is driven by
households most likely to have ration cards that entitle them to the largest
PDS subsidies, andwe cannot reject the hypothesis that households that are least
likely to possess ration cards did not change their diet relative to households in
border districts. Additionally, we ﬁnd evidence that households that are most
likely to have ration cards also signiﬁcantly increased overall calorie consump-
tion relative to border districts, while we also cannot reject the hypothesis that
households least likely to hold ration cards did not change their diet relative
to households in border districts.
We rule out a number of alternative channels for our ﬁndings. Most impor-
tantly, the lack of a change in diet in households least likely to be eligible for
subsidies suggests that the results are not likely to be driven by the advent of
statehood and improvements in overall governance for the entire population
in Chhattisgarh. Additionally, there were national reforms to the PDS that
gradually increased the available rations in all states, and these reforms poten-
tially affect the identiﬁcation of the effect of the Chhattisgarh reforms. These
reforms had differential effects on border districts from different states on the
basis of whether the state provided more than the basic rations before the
national reforms and the state’s ability to distribute the additional rations.
However, the additional reforms in Chhattisgarh combined with the poor pre-
reform coverage of the PDS caused the increase in food grain subsidies to be
much larger in Chhattisgarh than in border districts from any other state. Fur-
thermore, the baseline patterns continue to hold when we restrict border dis-
tricts to those from states where rations were larger than the provision by the
central government, to those from states where grains were not efﬁciently dis-
tributed and the increase in rations had very little effect on actual PDS con-
sumption, and to those where the national reforms resulted in larger PDS con-
sumption, albeit by much less than in Chhattisgarh.
This article adds to the literature analyzing the effects of food price subsi-
dies on diet quality and consumption. In particular, our results are related to
those of Jensen and Miller (2011), who ﬁnd no evidence of a nutritional re-2 We cannot precisely estimate which households were entitled to the largest subsidies in the
preperiod, and thus we cannot precisely identify an elasticity of nutrition with respect to an increase
in PDS subsidies.
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ference in ﬁndings could be a result of the nature of the subsidy. Jensen and
Miller (2011) consider price subsidies for staple grains in an amount that ex-
ceeds what households would normally consume (i.e., households are not
inframarginal), and thus their context involves both income and substitution
effects. In contrast, the PDS rations that we consider are less than what house-
holds would normally consume, and thus this setting focuses on income ef-
fects. This difference could also stem from differences in the level of develop-
ment of the treated populations. Households in Chhattisgarh that are entitled
to the largest PDS subsidies are potentially less well off than the poor Chinese
households analyzed by Jensen and Miller (2011).3
Our results also differ from studies that ﬁnd no evidence for an effect of PDS
consumption on malnutrition in India (Kochar 2005; Tarozzi 2005; Kaushal
and Muchomba 2013). Kaushal and Muchomba (2013) estimate the relation-
ship between nutrition levels and the size of the PDS subsidy, and instrument
for the size of the PDS subsidy with the estimated probability of having a
below-poverty-line (BPL) ration card. They ﬁnd no effect of changes to the
PDS in 2002 on nutrition in poorer and rural households.4 However, the pre-
dictors of ration card status are correlated with a number of factors that also
affect nutrition levels (e.g., wealth); thus, it is difﬁcult to attribute these changes
solely to the size of the PDS subsidies.
Tarozzi (2005) ﬁnds no evidence that a decrease in PDS subsidies affects the
weight of children under 4 years of age. The differences between the results
presented here and those of Tarozzi (2005) could be the result of a number
of factors. First, we document a larger change in the availability of PDS food
grains. Second, we are able to directly observe PDS participation and diet
choice at the household level. Last, Tarozzi (2005) utilizes evidence from a state
(Andhra Pradesh) in which the PDS functioned well, whereas we examine PDS
expansion in a less-developed state where the PDS initially functioned poorly.
Furthermore, the results presented here are similar to those presented by
Kaul (2014), which estimate the nutritional impact of the PDS by utilizing
variation in the size of the subsidies given differences in states in implement-3 It is difﬁcult to estimate the effect separately by wealth in the present setting. The poorest house-
holds are the only ones eligible for food price subsidies, and thus we see a larger effect for poorer
households. However, we do not observe ration card status in the presurvey, and thus we cannot es-
timate the effect separately by wealth for only households that are eligible for subsidies.
4 They do ﬁnd evidence that households that were more likely to be eligible for PDS subsidies in-
creased their consumption of PDS rice and wheat and lowered their consumption of coarse grains
relative to households that were less likely to be eligible for subsidies.
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60 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eing the PDS, such as indexing beneﬁts to family size, and variation in local
grains prices. In contrast to analyzing variation in policies across states, we fo-
cus on a dramatic change in a single state’s policies. These results also add to
the literature describing the ability of the PDS to reach the poor and the im-
plicit subsidies provided by the PDS (Dev and Suryanarayana 1991; Howes
and Jha 1992; Ahluwalia 1993; Parikh 1994; Indrakanth 1997; Radhakrishna
et al. 1997; Mooij 1999; Dutta and Ramaswami 2001).
Finally, this article is related to the literature analyzing the effects of in-kind
food assistance on diet choice in developed countries. Utilizing natural experi-
ments in the United States, a number of studies ﬁnd that in-kind food aid leads
to higher expenditure on food consumed at home (Hoynes and Shazenbach
2009; Beatty and Tuttle 2015). However, these studies are unable to identify
the nutritional content of this increased spending, which is the primary focus
of our analysis.5
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section II describes the PDS,
Section III describes the PDS reforms in the state of Chhattisgarh, Section IV
describes the data, Section V describes the estimation strategy and presents the
results, Section VI presents estimates of consumption changes by different
types of ration cards, Section VII presents a number of robustness checks,
and Section VIII concludes.II. The Public Distribution System
The PDS distributes a number of essential commodities to households across
India. These commodities primarily consist of food grains and kerosene. Be-
fore 1997, the program was available to almost all households, at least in prin-
ciple, and was intended to stabilize food prices and provide food security
(Radhakrishna et al. 1997). Following 1997, the PDS was transformed into
the Targeted Public Distribution System, which emphasized targeted food
subsidies for the poorest households (Ministry of Consumer Affairs 2002).
The PDS is run by both central and state governments. The central govern-
ment procures rice and wheat through the Food Corporation of India, which
pays a government-mandated minimum support price (MSP) to farmers. The
central government then allocates food grains at a much lower rate to individ-5 There are also a number of studies that try to estimate the marginal impact of food stamp beneﬁts
on nutrient or food availability in the United States (Ranney and Kushman 1987; Fraker 1990;
Devaney and Mofﬁtt 1991; Levedahl 1991; Fraker, Martini, and Ohls 1995). However, these studies
do not rely on natural experiments and cannot account for selection issues that make such elasticities
difﬁcult to interpret.
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by the ofﬁcial poverty line set by the Planning Commission (Ministry of Con-
sumer Affairs 2002). Important to our analysis, the number of BPL house-
holds in Chhattisgarh relative to states bordering Chhattisgarh is relatively sta-
ble during the time period under analysis. Speciﬁcally, the size of the BPL
population in each state was based on statewise poverty estimates for 1993–
4 and was adjusted on the basis of population growth in 1995 and 2000. Al-
though the relative size of the BPL population is stable, how those cards are
distributed changes over time.
State governments are responsible for identifying the PDS entitlements of
individual households and distributing PDS commodities through a network
of fair price shops (FPSs). State governments distribute ration cards to individ-
ual households, which entitle them to different quantities and rates of PDS
food grains. In this article, we refer to all ration cards that receive the most
preferential rates (Antyodaya and BPL cards) as BPL ration cards, and we refer
to all other ration cards as other ration cards. Households that do not have
ration cards are not entitled to purchase PDS food grains.
There are large differences in the PDS consumption patterns of households
with BPL ration cards and households with other types of ration cards. BPL
households generally consume high levels of PDS food grains, whereas non-
BPL households have much lower PDS consumption. Most non-BPL house-
holds do not consume any PDS food grains (e.g., Majumder 2001). In 2004–
5, approximately 52% of BPL households in Chhattisgarh and 72% of BPL
households in border districts consumed PDS rice. In contrast, very few non-
BPL households consume any PDS rice. In Chhattisgarh, approximately 4%
of households with other ration cards and 3% of households with no ration
cards consumed some PDS rice in 2004–5. These ﬁgures are 5% and 2%, re-
spectively, for border districts in this period.6
These differences are likely driven by the signiﬁcantly higher prices for PDS
grains faced by households without BPL ration cards. PDS grain prices for
these households can sometimes rise above the local market prices (Majumder
2001). Because PDS food grains are generally viewed as inferior goods (Rao
2000; Majumder 2001), households without a BPL ration card turn to PDS
grains only during times of economic distress, when market prices increase.
Consistent with this explanation, PDS consumption rose across the entire
country following the global food price crisis and the global ﬁnancial crisis
(Krishnamurthy et al. 2014).6 These ﬁgures are derived from the authors’ calculations using the 61st round of the NSSO consumer
expenditure survey.
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62 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G EThe delivery of PDS food grains to households is inefﬁcient in many states.
Estimates of diversion—the difference in the amount of PDS rations procured
by states and the amount households report they consume—are alarmingly
high (Ministry of Consumer Affairs 2002; Planning Commission 2005; Jha
and Ramaswami 2012). It is estimated that 54% of food grains were diverted
to the open market in 2004–5 (Dreze and Khera 2011). Recent research sug-
gests that some states have seen an improvement in PDS performance. Using a
small number of districts, Khera (2011a) estimates that households receive
more than 90% of their PDS ration on average and that they do not receive
low-quality grains. Khera (2011b) also ﬁnds that there are only a handful of
states in which the PDS continues to operate poorly, and households purchase
less than 80% of their rations on average. Although it is difﬁcult to identify
exactly how states turned around their distribution of PDS food grains, Khera
(2011b) suggests that the improvement is in part due to PDS reforms in these
states.
The PDS has been widely criticized. TheMinistry of Consumer Affairs pub-
lished a report criticizing the PDS along a number of dimensions: types of
commodities it provides, problems with targeting poor households, and inabil-
ity of a large number of poor and food-insecure households to obtain BPL rates
(Ministry of Consumer Affairs 2002). In light of these concerns, many com-
mentators have called for the government to fundamentally redesign its food
assistance program (Basu 2011). Other recommendations focus on improving
the current system by removing above-poverty-line subsidies for grains alto-
gether and increasing the number of households entitled to BPL rates to avoid
exclusion errors in targeting subsidies (Ministry of Consumer Affairs 2002).
III. PDS Reforms in Chhattisgarh between 2000 and 2004
Chhattisgarh instituted a number of reforms to improve the functioning of its
PDS. Table 1 presents a timeline of these reforms. Most importantly for our
analysis, two of these reforms took place before 2004. First, Chhattisgarh al-
lowed private dealers to run FPSs, which improved access to FPSs across the
state. Second, Chhattisgarh increased the amount of rice that it procured di-
rectly from in-state farmers to be distributed through the PDS.
Lack of access to FPSs is especially important in a predominantly rural
state such as Chhattisgarh. In 2000 the number of FPSs per 1,000 people
in Chhattisgarh was less than half the number in border states (ﬁg. 1). At this
time, all the FPSs in Chhattisgarh were operated by cooperatives, but accord-
ing to the state government, they were not in a ﬁnancial position to extend
their coverage (Patnaik 2005). The government of India also voiced concerns
over FPS coverage in rural areas and suggested that reforms to the operation ofThis content downloaded from 139.184.066.135 on November 10, 2017 07:43:39 AM
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ment of India 2006).
In 2001, Chhattisgarh began to grant licenses to own and operate FPSs to
private parties under the Sarvajanik Nagrik Poorti Vitran scheme. As a result
of this reform, the number of FPSs in the state increased by 76% between
2001 and 2004 (ﬁg. 1). By 2004, nearly 60% of FPSs were privately owned
and operated.7 Given that households are tied to a single FPS and there was
such a substantial increase in the number of FPSs, there was likely a decrease
in the average distance a household had to travel to purchase subsidized grains,
which makes it easier to purchase the full ration.
In addition to privatizing the ownership of FPSs, Chhattisgarh also restruc-
tured its system of procurement for PDS rice. In 2002, Chhattisgarh began to
participate in the decentralized procurement scheme (DCP). Under the DCP,
state governments procure rice and wheat directly from local farmers at the
MSP and are reimbursed by the central government. From 2002 to 2004,
PDS rice procurement by Chhattisgarh rose from just under 1 million metric
tons to just under 2 million metric tons, an increase of almost 100% (ﬁg. 1).
However, importantly, the scheme offered the same MSP as is offered underTABLE 1
TIMELINE OF MAJOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (PDS) REFORMS IN CHHATTISGARH SINCE 2000
Year Reform Description
Instituted before Raman Singh–led
government (2000–2003):
2001 Sarvajanik Nagrik Poorti
Vitran scheme
Allowed private participation
in distribution of PDS
commodities
2002 Decentralized
procurement scheme
Allowed state government
to procure rice directly from
farmers
Instituted by Raman Singh–led
government (2004 onward):
2004 PDS (Control) Order of 2004 Deprivatized FPSs, instituted a
number of transparency and
auditing mechanisms to dis-
tribution of food grains7 The privately run FPSs were not intend
private dealers to extend PDS subsidies
2005).
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64 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Ecentralized procurement, and the program likely did not have any signiﬁcant
income effects for Chhattisgarh farmers. Rather than trying to provide addi-
tional income support for farmers, the primary beneﬁts of the procurement
scheme, according to the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, is to provide grainsFigure 1. Impacts of Public Distribution System (PDS) reforms in Chhattisgarh (CT) and border regions. Top panel
presents the number of fair price shops per 1,000 people in Chhattisgarh and states bordering Chhattisgarh, mid-
dle panel presents the total amount of PDS rice procured in millions of metric tons by the state government in
Chhattisgarh and states bordering Chhattisgarh, and bottom panel presents daily per capita PDS rice calorie con-
sumption in Chhattisgarh and districts bordering Chhattisgarh. Vertical line denotes the time when Chhattisgarh
implemented their PDS reforms. Top and bottom panels report data that are available annually, whereas bottom
panel reports the change in consumption between 2000–2001 and 2004–5. Bottom panel is qualitatively identical
if all households from bordering states are included. Top and middle panels are replicated from Krishnamurthy
et al. (2014). Data are obtained from annual reports published by the Ministry of Consumer Affairs and from “Pro-
gramme Evaluation of Targeted Public Distribution System,” published by the Planning Commission in 2005. Data
on fair price shops and state PDS rice procurement are not available at the district level from these sources. Bottom
panel uses data from the 55th and 61st rounds of the consumer expenditure surveys conducted by the National
Sample Survey Organization. States that border Chhattisgarh are Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh. A color version of this ﬁgure is available online.This content downloaded from 139.184.066.135 on November 10, 2017 07:43:39 AM
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of grains that suited local tastes slightly increased the amount of PDS grains
that households were willing to consume and could represent an increase in
the availability of PDS food grains relative to border districts.
In contrast, states with districts that share a border with Chhattisgarh did
not, to the best of our knowledge, undertake comparably comprehensive
state-speciﬁc PDS reforms between 1999 and 2004. A search of news stories
in the Times of India and theHindu from 1998 to 2005 reveals no evidence of
large-scale PDS reforms in neighboring states, and studies of PDS diversion
across states over this time period do not mention reforms in these states
(Khera 2011a, 2011b).9 However, a number of states bordering Chhattisgarh
Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Odisha implemented PDS reforms af-
ter 2005, and thus we restrict the analysis between 1999–2000 and 2004–5.
Consistent with the Chhattisgarh PDS reforms having an effect, per capita
consumption of PDS rice more than tripled over the period under analysis
(ﬁg. 1).10 However, consistent with the lack of reform in bordering states,
there was little change in FPS coverage, PDS rice procured directly by govern-
ments, and average PDS rice consumption in states that border Chhattisgarh
(ﬁg. 1).11
However, there were national changes to the PDS over this time period that
affected all states. Speciﬁcally, there was a gradual increase of the BPL ration
over the time period as well as a slight decrease in the price of PDS grains for
BPL cardholders. The ration was increased from 20 to 25 kilograms in July
2001 and then further to 35 kilograms in April 2002, and the price of BPL
grains was decreased from 50% of cost to the Food Corporation of India to
48% (Umali-Deininger, Sur, and Deininger 2005).8 For example, see the description of the program from the Ministry of Consumer Affairs (http://
dfpd.nic.in/decentralized-procurement.htm).
9 Speciﬁcally, we searched the two newspapers using Factiva. We searched for the words “public,”
“distribution,” and “system” and the name of the state in each individual search.
10 This ﬁgure is reproduced from Krishnamurthy et al. (2014).
11 It is important to note that there were differences in the trends in PDS rice consumption in
Chhattisgarh and border districts in the period before the PDS reforms. The Targeted Public Distri-
bution System (TPDS) was only introduced in 1997. Before the TDPS, the subsidies were very
small, and PDS grains were available to all households. As a result of the small subsidy, there was
very little PDS consumption before the introduction of the large subsidy for BPL households in
1997. Once the larger subsidy for poor households was introduced, there were large changes in
PDS consumption in some states that were able to distribute a signiﬁcant amount of rations to poor
residents (e.g., Andhra Pradesh, Orissa). However, the districts that later formed Chhattisgarh had
few FPSs, and a signiﬁcant amount of grains were diverted to the open market. As a result, there
was not as large of an increase in PDS consumption in Chhattisgarh when the TDPS was introduced
relative to the average change in all of the districts that border Chhattisgarh.
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66 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G EAlthough these are sizable increases in food price subsidies, the national re-
forms likely did not have as large of an effect as expected in a number of states
that border Chhattisgarh. First, during the time period, a large share of grains
did not make it to beneﬁciaries in a number of states and were rather diverted
to the market (Khera 2011b). Thus, in the states where PDS grains were very
inefﬁcient (e.g., Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh), there was little change in PDS con-
sumption following the national reforms. Second, other states were already
providing rations above the quota before the national reforms (e.g., Andhra
Pradesh, Orissa), and thus there was similarly little change in PDS consump-
tion in those states (e.g., Dutta and Ramaswami 2001; Bedamatta 2006).
Alternatively, the increase in household PDS consumption in Chhattisgarh
(317%) far outpaced the increase in border districts contained in states where
the national quota increase did increase PDS consumption: Madhya Pradesh
(175%) and Maharashtra (111%). This difference is likely driven by two fac-
tors. First, the expansion of FPSs in Chhattisgarh that did not occur in neigh-
boring states allowed beneﬁciaries to collect the original rations that they were
unable to purchase. Second, the expansion of FPSs also allowed the state to
distribute a higher share of the grains included in the quota increase, given still
pervasive leakages in the PDS in both Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra (e.g.,
Khera 2011b).
Given potential variation in the degree of treatment in these three different
groups, in addition to analyzing the changes in nutrition in Chhattisgarh to all
border districts, we also analyze the change in Chhattisgarh relative to border
districts in states where rations were larger than the provision by the central
government (Andhra Pradesh and Orissa), in states where grains were not ef-
ﬁciently distributed and the increase in rations had very little effect on actual
PDS consumption (Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh), and in states where the na-
tional reforms resulted in larger PDS consumption, albeit by much less than
in Chhattisgarh (Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra). Last, there was an an-
nounced PDS reform in Chhattisgarh that affected the expansion of FPS cov-
erage. Speciﬁcally, the PDS (Control) Order of 2004 was announced at the
end of December 2004, which, among other things, discontinued the opera-
tion of private FPSs. However, implementation of the order was delayed until
the resolution of a Supreme Court case in September 2005 after the end of the
postsurvey used in the analysis (Patnaik 2005). It is likely that during this pe-
riod of uncertainty, privately run FPSs discontinued operation before the FPSs
could be turned over to the Gram Panchayats, cooperative societies, self-help
groups, and forest protection committees that were permitted to operate them.
Thus, if the uncertainty led to a decline in FPSs in 2005 relative to 2004, weThis content downloaded from 139.184.066.135 on November 10, 2017 07:43:39 AM
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Krishnamurthy, Pathania, and Tandon 67could expect a larger change in nutrition for households surveyed in 2004 as
opposed to those surveyed in 2005.
Consistent with the uncertainty leading to the exit of FPSs, there was a
sharp drop in PDS rice consumption in Chhattisgarh between households sur-
veyed in 2004 and those surveyed in 2005, while there was no change in dis-
tricts bordering Chhattisgarh (Krishnamurthy et al. 2014). Despite this de-
cline, PDS rice consumption in Chhattisgarh was still much higher in 2005
than in 1999–2000. Furthermore, this difference between Chhattisgarh and
border districts cannot be explained by observable characteristics in the house-
holds surveyed in 2004 and 2005. The 2004–5 consumer expenditure survey
was conducted from June 2004 to June 2005, and the stratiﬁcation of house-
holds surveyed between June–December 2004 and January–June 2005 was
identical in order to avoid issues with seasonality.
IV. Data
In order to estimate the response of diet choice to PDS consumption, we utilize
consumption data obtained from consumer expenditure surveys conducted by
the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) in India. Each survey is a
repeated cross section and covers the entire country. The survey is stratiﬁed
by geographical area and whether a household resides in a rural or urban area.
After the primary sampling units have been randomly selected, the survey is
further stratiﬁed by household afﬂuence. In the baseline estimates, we utilize the
thick rounds conducted in 1999–2000 (55th round) and 2004–5 (61st round).
Each survey provides data on quantities and values of approximately 150
food items consumed over the past 30 days and separately reports the amount
of PDS rice, wheat, sugar, and kerosene consumed by each household. We
utilize the 30-day reference period, as opposed to the 7-day reference period,
for the 55th round to make it more comparable to the 61st round.12 Each
survey also reports a number of household characteristics and the district in
which each household resides. From these data, we are able to estimate con-
sumption of macro- and micronutrients from each source by utilizing nutri-
tional information provided by Gopalan, Rama Sastri, and Balasubramanian
(1989), which is the source commonly used by the Government of India to
estimate the nutritional content of consumption from NSSO data (e.g., Na-
tional Sample Survey Organization 2007). Gopalan et al. (1989) provides nu-
tritional information for 592 food items that are common in the Indian diet,12 However, the rounds are not entirely comparable, given that the same households were asked to
report both 7- and 30-day recall periods in the 55th round (e.g., Deaton and Dreze 2002; Deaton
and Kozel 2005).
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68 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Ewhich is a much ﬁner level of detail than reported by the NSSO consumer
expenditure survey.13 We estimate nutritional information only for foods
consumed at home. This omits certain processed foods and meals consumed
outside the household, for which nutritional information is difﬁcult to pre-
cisely estimate.
There are some differences between the two surveys used in the baseline
analysis. Although both surveys provide information on the amount of PDS
commodities consumed, only the survey conducted in 2004–5 contains infor-
mation on whether households have a ration card entitling them to purchase
PDS food grains. The survey conducted in 1999–2000 did ask whether the
lack of a ration card was the reason no PDS purchase was made in the prior
30 days. Unfortunately, the NSSO did not include this information on the
publicly available data ﬁle. This difference between the surveys matters most
in speciﬁcations in which changes in diet choice are estimated separately for
households with different types of ration cards.
We use these surveys to compare nutrient consumption in Chhattisgarh—
or districts in Madhya Pradesh that would later become Chhattisgarh—to nu-
trient consumption in districts that border the state. District boundaries change
over time, so we utilize the boundaries in effect in 1999, the time the baseline
survey (55th round) used in the empirical analysis was conducted. However,
during the time period, one district was carved out of two existing districts.
In this instance, the two districts were aggregated to a larger region to keep
borders consistent across all surveys. The border districts come from a num-
ber of states: Andhra Pradesh (three), Jharkhand (three), Maharashtra (two),
Madhya Pradesh (six), Odisha (eight), and Uttar Pradesh (one).14 Figure 2
presents a map of Chhattisgarh and districts that border the state.13 For example, household calorie consumption is calculated as RNg51Quantityg  AveCalorieg for each
household, where g denotes each food item, Quantityg denotes the total household consumption of
good g, and AveCalorieg denotes average calories contained per unit of good g and is obtained from
Gopalan et al. (1989). For the calculation of other nutrients, we use the average nutritional value per
unit of food item g obtained from Gopalan et al. (1989; e.g., AveProteing). There exist other sources to
estimate calorie information, such as the concordance used by the Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations (FAO; http://faostat.fao.org). However, the list of food items detailed by FAO
is not nearly as detailed as that detailed by Gopalan et al. (1989; contains approximately one-tenth of
the food items), and the food items are not tailored speciﬁcally to foods commonly consumed in In-
dia. Regardless, the nutritional content of consumption is similar when using both of these two map-
pings (e.g., Tandon and Landes 2011).
14 The districts that border Chhattisgarh are listed as follows: from Andhra Pradesh: Karimnagar,
Khammam, Warangal; from Jharkhand: Garhwa, Gumla, Simdega; from Maharashtra: Bhandara,
Chandrapur; from Madhya Pradesh: Anuppur, Balaghat, Dindori, Shahdol, Sidhi, Singrauli; from
Odisha: Bargarh, Jharsuguda, Kalahandi, Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur, Naupada, Sundargarh;
and from Uttar Pradesh: Sonbhadra.
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Krishnamurthy, Pathania, and Tandon 69Table 2 presents summary statistics separated by survey and illustrates a
number of important consumption patterns. First, in the 2004–5 survey,
slightly less than one-third of households have a BPL card entitling them to
the largest PDS subsidies, and approximately 38% of households have no ra-
tion cards and therefore are not entitled to purchase PDS food grains. There-
fore, each type of household is well represented in the sample, which allows us
to separate consumption by type of ration card in the 2004–5 survey. Second,
average calorie consumption and protein consumption for the entire sampleFigure 2.Map of Chhattisgarh and border districts. Since the state formed in 2000, a small number of districts that
had bordered Chhattisgarh split into two districts, one of which no longer borders the state in the 2004–5 survey.
However, to be consistent, 1999–2000 boundaries are used, and all regions that had bordered Chhattisgarh at that
time are identiﬁed as border districts. The districts that border Chhattisgarh are as follows: from Andhra Pradesh:
Karimnagar, Khammam, Warangal; from Jharkhand: Garhwa, Gumla, Simdega; from Maharashtra: Bhandara,
Chandrapur; from Madhya Pradesh: Anuppur, Balaghat, Dindori, Shahdol, Sidhi, Singrauli; from Orissa: Bargarh,
Jharsuguda, Kalahandi, Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur, Naupada, Sundargarh; and from Uttar Pradesh: Son-
bhadra. A color version of this ﬁgure is available online.This content downloaded from 139.184.066.135 on November 10, 2017 07:43:39 AM
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70 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Edeclined between the 55th and 61st rounds, which is consistent with national
trends over this time period (e.g., National Sample Survey Organization 2007;
Deaton and Dreze 2009). In addition to the thick rounds conducted in 1999–
2000 (55th round) and 2004–5 (61st round), this study also utilizes the thick
round conducted in 1993–4 (50th round) and utilizes the thin rounds con-
ducted in 1997 (53rd round) and 1998 (54th round) to estimate trends in con-
sumption before the formation of Chhattisgarh.15TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR CHHATTISGARH AND BORDER DISTRICTS BY SURVEY
1999–2000
(1)
2004–5
(2)
Daily per capita consumption:
Protein (grams) 52.6 (31.1) 51.2 (25.5)
Calories 2,060.0 (937.2) 1,923.0 (757.9)
Dietary minerals (manganese, copper, iodine, zinc,
cobalt, ﬂuoride, and selenium [grams]) 7.72 (6.31) 7.78 (5.20)
Calcium (grams) 285.3 (871.9) 355.7 (744.3)
Iron (grams) 23.0 (13.0) 27.5 (43.0)
Fiber (grams) 4.83 (6.55) 4.93 (9.31)
Share of households:
With a BPL card . . . .313 (.464)
With a non-BPL card . . . .305 (.460)
With no ration card . . . .382 (.486)
That are self-employed .152 (.359) .246 (.431)
That are rural .708 (.454) .727 (.446)
That belong to a scheduled caste .148 (.355) .150 (.357)
That belong to a scheduled tribe .271 (.444) .270 (.444)
That belong to an other backward class .385 (.487) .417 (.493)
That are Hindu, Sikh, Jain, or Buddhist .944 (.229) .937 (.244)
That are Muslim .029 (.169) .029 (.169)
That are Christian .026 (.160) .034 (.181)
With household members that are illiterate .473 (.349) .420 (.331)
With heads that are illiterate .424 (.494) .371 (.483)
With spouses that are illiterate .553 (.497) .501 (.500)
With heads that never attended school .443 (.497) .384 (.486)
With spouses that never attended school .722 (.448) .684 (.465)
That have a spouse .839 (.368) .822 (.383)
Observations 5,787 7,02915 The sampling procedure is different between the thin an
rounds the stratiﬁcation is based on sector (rural vs. urban)
of the rural/urban sample in the two types of rounds differ
types of surveys are identical when conditioning on sector a
the analysis to particular second-stage strata within which
Furthermore, the thin rounds also report fewer househol
which limits household-level control variables in speciﬁcat
that are available in all surveys.
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Krishnamurthy, Pathania, and Tandon 71V. Estimation Strategy and Baseline Results
Our identiﬁcation strategy is to compare changes in nutrient consumption of
households in Chhattisgarh to those of households in districts bordering the
state that did not experience reforms. We utilize households in border districts
to construct the counterfactual of consumption changes in Chhattisgarh in
the absence of PDS reforms. Households in border districts are more likely
to be similar to households in Chhattisgarh in terms of their unobserved char-
acteristics than are households from the rest of India. Table 3 presents sum-
mary statistics for nutrient consumption and household characteristics for
households in Chhattisgarh and those in border districts before the PDS re-
forms. Consistent with our assumption, column 3 shows that there are few
observable differences between households in Chhattisgarh and border districts
aside from PDS consumption.
We implement this identiﬁcation strategy by estimating the following base-
line speciﬁcation:
lnðNutrient_ConsumptionidtÞ 5 kd 1 gCTidt  Postidt 1 bXidt 1 eidt , (1)
where d denotes districts according to 1999 boundaries, t denotes the time pe-
riod (t5 1999, 2004), kd denotes district ﬁxed effects, Nutrient_Consumption
denotes daily per capita consumption of protein and other nutrients, CT de-
notes an indicator equal to 1 if the household resides in Chhattisgarh, Post de-
notes an indicator equal to 1 if the household observation is taken from the
2004–5 survey, and X contains Post and time-varying control variables.16
The coefﬁcient of interest is g, which gives the difference-in-differences es-
timate of the effect of PDS reforms on nutrient consumption. If the increased
availability of PDS rice led to higher nutrient consumption in Chhattisgarh
relative to border districts, then estimates of g should be positive and signiﬁ-
cant. The baseline speciﬁcation estimates robust standard errors clustered at
the district level. To account for the possibility of state-level correlation in the
error term, we also include p-values based on standard errors clustered at the
state level. Given the small number of border states, we estimate the stan-
dard errors clustered at the state level in two ways: using the wild cluster16 Controls include indicators for whether a household resides in a rural area, indicators for whether a
household is self-employed, indicators for household religion (Muslim, Christian, Hindu/Sikh/Jain/
Buddhist), and indicators for whether a household belongs to a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe,
an indicator for whether the household belongs to an otherwise backward class, the share of the
household that is illiterate, an indicator equaling 1 if the household head is illiterate, an indicator
equaling 1 if the spouse of the household head is illiterate, an indicator equaling 1 if the household
head did not ever attend school, an indicator equaling 1 if the spouse of the household head did not
ever attend school, and an indicator equaling 1 if the household head is married.
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TABLE 3
AVERAGE NONGRAIN CONSUMPTION AND HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS IN CHHATTISGARH
AND BORDER DISTRICTS BEFORE PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (PDS) REFORMS
Average in Chhattisgarh
in 1999–2000
(1)
Average in Border
Districts in 1999–2000
(2)
Difference
(col. 1 2 col. 2)
(3)
ln(per capita calorie consumption
from PDS rice) .908 3.13 22.22***
(.570) (.074) (.422)
ln(per capita consumption of protein) 7.23 7.26 2.024
(.017) (.012) (.049)
ln(per capita consumption of
total calories) 10.9 10.9 2.032
(.020) (.014) (.049)
ln(per capita consumption of minerals) 5.31 5.34 2.027
(.014) (.010) (.064)
ln(per capita consumption of iron) 6.40 6.40 2.002
(.016) (.011) (.074)
ln(per capita consumption of calcium) 8.76 8.77 2.014
(.022) (.015) (.118)
ln(per capita consumption of ﬁber) 4.61 4.76 2.150
(.017) (.013) (.133)
Self-employed .147 .155 2.008
(.007) (.006) (.014)
Rural .707 .710 2.003
(.010) (.008) (.055)
Scheduled caste .139 .154 2.015
(.007) (.006) (.029)
Scheduled tribe .263 .276 2.013
(.009) (.008) (.071)
Other backward class .427 .358 .069
(.010) (.008) (.073)
Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, or Jain .955 .938 .017
(.004) (.004) (.015)
Muslim .028 .030 2.002
(.003) (.003) (.010)
Christian .017 .032 2.015
(.003) (.003) (.015)
Illiterate household members .450 .489 2.039
(.007) (.006) (.032)
Illiterate household head .394 .443 2.049
(.010) (.008) (.041)
Illiterate spouse .550 .555 2.006
(.010) (.008) (.027)
Heads that never attended school .411 .464 2.054
(.010) (.008) (.042)
Spouses that never attended school .723 .721 .002
(.009) (.008) (.031)
Households that have a spouse .836 .841 2.005
(.008) (.006) (.015)
Observations 2,292 3,495 . . .This content downloade
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Krishnamurthy, Pathania, and Tandon 73bootstrap percentile-t method described by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller
(2008) and using randomization inference, which is described by Cohen
and Dupas (2010).
Households in Chhattisgarh increased their protein consumption relative to
border districts between 1999–2000 and 2004–5. Table 4 reports these ﬁnd-
ings from the baseline speciﬁcation. Column1 estimates the simplest difference-
in-differences speciﬁcation, column 2 adds district ﬁxed effects, column 3 adds
household-level control variables, and column 4 adds NSSO sampling weights
tomake the estimate representative of the population. The estimates are positive
and similar in magnitude, and the estimates are most precisely estimated in the
most complete speciﬁcations. In the most complete speciﬁcations in columns 3
and 4, households in Chhattisgarh increased their consumption of protein by
17.8% and 25.5% more than households in border districts. Although the es-
timates are slightly less precisely estimated, the results are similar when cluster-
ing the standard errors at the state level. However, it is important to note that
given the small number of states, the lowest attainable p-value using randomi-
zation inference is 0.143.
Chhattisgarh had higher growth in the consumption of a number of other
beneﬁcial nutrients. Columns 5–9 of table 4 reports estimates of speciﬁcations
using consumption of other nutrients as the dependent variable. In particular,
total consumption of iron, calcium, and dietary minerals (manganese, copper,
iodine, zinc, cobalt, ﬂuoride, and selenium) signiﬁcantly increased in Chhat-
tisgarh relative to border districts. However, the estimate of total calorie con-
sumption was less precisely estimated. Thus, although calorie consumption
increased in Chhattisgarh relative to border districts, one cannot reject the hy-
pothesis that the change was identical in the two regions at standard levels of
signiﬁcance in speciﬁcations that use the entire sample of households from
Chhattisgarh.17
Important to the interpretation of the results presented in tables 4 and S1
(tables S1, S2 are available online) demonstrates that there were not any dif-
ferential income effects for farmers primarily engaged in cereal cultivation in17 The increase in calorie consumption in Chhattisgarh was less robust than the increase in other nu-
trients (protein, dietary minerals, and calcium) because households reduced consumption of oils.
Oils typically used in Indian diets are rich in calories and fat but contain no other beneﬁcial nutrients
(Gopalan et al. 1989). Consistent with poorer households using more oils in food preparation than
richer households to maintain adequate calorie consumption, in speciﬁcations not reported, we ﬁnd
that oil consumption increases with expenditure across all of India but at a rapidly declining rate. The
rate is declining quickly enough such that the correlation is positive for households below the median
nonfood expenditure, and the correlation is negative for households above the median nonfood ex-
penditure.
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Krishnamurthy, Pathania, and Tandon 75Chhattisgarh relative to border states, where decentralized procurement was
not similarly adopted. Furthermore, the baseline empirical patterns we ﬁnd
are identical when we restrict the sample to urban households or to house-
holds that do not rely on either cereal production or any other type of agricul-
tural production.18
VI. Consumption Changes by Type of Subsidy
We separately estimate the growth of protein consumption in Chhattisgarh,
relative to border districts, on the basis of eligibility for PDS subsidies. How-
ever, we do not observe ration card status in the preround and thus cannot ob-
serve the amount of food price subsidies to which each household is entitled.
Thus, we rely on estimating the baseline speciﬁcation separately for house-
holds on the basis of their predicted probability of having a ration card. The
predicted probability is derived using predictors of ration card status in the
postround, where we do observe ration card status of each household.
Speciﬁcally, we estimate the probability of a household having a BPL ration
card using a probit speciﬁcation in the 2004–5 survey, where the set of control
variables in the baseline speciﬁcation are used as predictors of ration card sta-
tus.19 We then use these ﬁtted values to estimate the probability of ration card
status in both the 1999–2000 and 2004–5 surveys.
Utilizing these estimates, we reestimate the baseline speciﬁcation separately
for each quintile of predicted probabilities. The estimates are presented in
columns 1–5 of table 5. Columns 1 and 2 demonstrate that we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the changes in protein consumption in Chhattisgarh and
border districts were identical for the two quintiles that were least likely to be
entitled to the largest PDS subsidies. However, the estimates in columns 3–5
demonstrate that changes in protein consumption in the baseline speciﬁcation
were driven by the three quintiles most likely to be entitled to the largest sub-
sidies. The point estimates are higher than those presented in columns 1 and
2, and the estimates are more precisely estimated.20
In addition to proxying for ration card ownership in the preperiod, we also
compare protein consumption by type of ration card in the postsurvey to av-
erage consumption in the presurvey. We estimate the baseline speciﬁcation
while restricting postobservations to households with BPL ration cards and18 These results are available upon request from the authors.
19 See table S2 for the estimates from this speciﬁcation.
20 Alternatively, it is possible to estimate a model pooling all households and interacting quintile in-
dicators with a Chhattisgarh indicator and a Post indicator. Estimates from such a speciﬁcation yield
similar results to estimates presented in table 5, where households that are most likely to have BPL
cards are those for whom nutrition increased following the PDS reforms.
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76 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eall households without a BPL card. For these speciﬁcations, g measures the
difference between the average protein consumption for ration card holders
in the postsurvey and the average for all households in the presurvey in Chhat-
tisgarh relative to border districts.
However, restricting the sample in the postperiod by type of ration card re-
quires additional assumptions to produce unbiased difference-in-differences
estimates. To see what those conditions might be, we ﬁrst derive the estimate
of our ideal speciﬁcation where we can identify BPL card holders in both the
pre- and postperiods. Speciﬁcally, we would have computed the following
double difference estimator for the BPL sample:
DD 5 E Y Tpost,B 2 Y
T
pre,B ∣ X
 
2 E Y Cpost,B 2 Y
C
pre,B ∣ X
 
,
5 E Y Tpost,B 2 Y
C
post,B ∣ X
 
2 E Y Tpre,B 2 Y
C
pre,B ∣ X
 
:TABLE 5
BASELINE ESTIMATES SEPARATED BY TYPE OF RATION CARD
Restrict Sample to Quintile of Probability of
Having a Ration Card
Restrict Sample to House-
holds in Postsurvey
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
With BPL
Cards
Without BPL
Cards
Dependent
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(protein) .178 .105 .263** .115 .175* .198** .086
(.129) (.093) (.114) (.088) (.091) (.068) (.065)
p-value BS .224 .252 .016** .17 .304 . . . . . .
p-value RI .286 .286 .143 .143 .286 . . . . . .
ln(calories) .124 .034 .153 .091 .174** .136* 2.024
(.103) (.111) (.162) (.086) (.084) (.069) (.067)
p-value BS .434 .621 .044** .232 .460 . . . . . .
p-value RI .429 .429 .143 .286 .286 . . . . . .
Observations 1,398 2,498 2,993 3,161 2,766 4,308 6,176T
All use subject his content downloaded from 139.184.066.135 on Novembe
to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http:r 10, 2017 07
//www.journaNote. Difference-in-differences estimate for consumption between 1999–2000 and 2004–5 separated by
types of subsidies to which households are entitled. Top panel utilizes the natural logarithm of total pro-
tein consumed as the dependent variable, and bottom panel utilizes the natural logarithm of total calories
consumed. Each cell represents an estimate of the coefﬁcient of an interaction between the Chhattisgarh
and Post indicators in the baseline speciﬁcation, restricted to a different subset of the total sample. Col-
umns 1–5 restrict the sample to quintiles of the estimated probability of having a ration card on the basis of
demographic control variables used in the baseline speciﬁcation; columns 6–8 restrict the sample to
households with a below-poverty-line (BPL) ration card, above-poverty-line ration card, and no ration card,
respectively, in the postperiod. Columns 6–8 exclude households residing in the states that are the most
dissimilar to Chhattisgarh in terms of protein consumption and expenditure (Andhra Pradesh, Maharash-
tra, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh). All speciﬁcations include district ﬁxed effects and control variables. Control
variables included are listed in footnote 17. All speciﬁcations also report p-values of the coefﬁcient on the
interaction of the Chhattisgarh indicator and a Post variable using the wild cluster bootstrap percentile-t
method (p-value BS) and randomization inference (p-value RI) to estimate standard errors clustered by
state. Standard errors clustered by district are reported in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.:43:39 AM
ls.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Krishnamurthy, Pathania, and Tandon 77Here, Y st,i is the outcome of interest (i.e., nongrain calorie consumption) for
the treatment (T ) or control (C) states in the period t (pre- or postperiod)
for group i (BPL card holders [B] or others [N ]). The second row is an equiv-
alent way of expressing the double-difference estimator; it nets out the pre-
period difference in levels between the treatment and control groups from
the postperiod difference and attributes any residual change to the treatment.
However, since we can identify only the BPL card holders in the post-
period, we estimate speciﬁcations in which we restrict the postperiod sample
to BPL card holders only (while keeping the entire preperiod sample, which is
a mix of BPL card holders and the others). Let aT and aC be the fraction of
sampled households that do not own BPL cards in the treatment and control
states, respectively. Assume that these fractions remain the same in the pre-
and postperiods. Then our modiﬁed speciﬁcation estimates the following dou-
ble difference:
DD0 5 E Y Tpost,B 2 a
T Y Tpre,N 1 ð1 2 aT ÞY Tpre,B
 
∣ X
 
2 E Y Cpost ,B 2 a
CY Cpre,N 1 ð1 2 aCÞY Cpre,B
 
∣ X
 
,
5 E Y Tpost,B 2 Y
C
post ,B ∣ X
 
2 E Y Tpre,B 1 a
T ðY Tpre,N 2 Y Tpre,BÞ
 
2 Y Cpre,B 1 a
CðY Cpre,N 2 Y Cpre,BÞ
 
∣ X
 
:
The second decomposition of the modiﬁed estimator (DD 0) as shown in the
equation above is instructive. Once again, the preperiod difference in levels
between the treatment and control group is being netted out of the postperiod
difference except for the fact that the preperiod difference is for the entire sam-
ple, which is a mix of BPL card holders and the others.
We can see the source of potential bias in DD 0 when we compare the above
expressions. While we estimate the same (conditional) postperiod difference
between the treatment and control group in both cases, we have different es-
timates of the preperiod difference. We can formalize the bias as follows:
Bias 5 DD0 2 DD
5 E ½aCðY Cpre,N 2 Y Cpre,BÞ 2 aT ðY Tpre,N 2 Y Tpre,BÞ ∣ X :
There are a number of things to note about this expression. First, note
that aT , aC > 0. Similarly, we expect that E ½Y Cpre,N 2 Y Cpre,BjX  and E ½Y Tpre,N 2
Y Tpre,BjX  to be positive since BPL card holders are among the poorest in the
population. Therefore, both terms in the equation are positive. The ﬁrst term
measures the positive distortion to the conditional mean Y of the BPL card
holders in the control states because of the fact that we are actually measuring
the conditional mean of the entire sample (BPL and others.) This distortionThis content downloaded from 139.184.066.135 on November 10, 2017 07:43:39 AM
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78 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eis increasing in the share of the non-BPL card holders in the sample (aC) and
the intergroup difference in means (Y Cpre,N 2 Y Cpre,B). The second term measures
this distortion for the treatment state.
It is important to note that all the bias stems from mismeasurement in
the starting points for the double difference estimation. Intuitively, if the start-
ing point for the control states is more distorted than for the treatment state
because aC > aT and/or because there is much more difference in mean Y be-
tween the BPL card holders and others in the treatment state, then the modiﬁed
estimator,DD0, picks that up as a large decline in themean for the control states
in the postperiod—a positive bias.
The strict condition for no bias requires that aC 5 aT and that E ½ðY Cpre,N 2
Y Cpre,BjX  5 E ½ðY Tpre,N 2 Y Tpre,BÞjX . Thus, the sufﬁcient conditions for an unbi-
ased estimate are that in the presurvey (1) the share of households with BPL
cards in Chhattisgarh is equal to the share in border districts, and (2) the av-
erage difference in protein consumption between households with BPL ration
cards and households without ration cards in Chhattisgarh is equal to the dif-
ference in border districts. Although these are stringent conditions, we utilize
border districts precisely because they are similar to Chhattisgarh.21
Given these conditions, we exclude border districts from states that are
most different from Chhattisgarh. Speciﬁcally, we exclude border districts in
Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra because they differ the most from Chhat-
tisgarh in terms of household expenditure in the presurvey, and we exclude
border districts in Orissa and Uttar Pradesh because they differ the most in
terms of protein consumption in the presurvey. Columns 6 and 7 of table 5
report these estimates where we restrict the sample in the postperiod to those
that do and do not have BPL cards. These results continue to suggest that
households with ration cards that entitle them to the highest PDS subsidies
are driving the change in protein consumption in Chhattisgarh.
Last, we reestimate the speciﬁcations described above using total calorie
consumption as the dependent variable in the bottom panel of table 5. The
estimates suggest that total calorie consumption did increase for households
most likely to be eligible for the largest PDS subsidies, and we see that when
we restrict the households in the postperiod to only those entitled to large PDS21 In results not reported, we cannot reject the hypotheses that (1) the share of households with BPL
cards in Chhattisgarh is equal to the share in border districts in the postsurvey and (2) the average
difference in protein consumption between households with proxied ration cards and households
without proxied ration cards in Chhattisgarh is equal to the difference in border districts in the
presurvey.
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Krishnamurthy, Pathania, and Tandon 79subsidies, calorie consumption similarly increases in Chhattisgarh relative to
border districts.
VII. Robustness Checks of the Baseline Speciﬁcation
We perform a number of additional robustness checks for our baseline spec-
iﬁcation. First, given the differential levels of treatment caused by the national
reforms discussed in Section III, we reestimate the baseline speciﬁcation in
columns 1–3 of table 6 but respectively restrict the border districts to those
from states where rations were larger than the provision by the central govern-
ment (Andhra Pradesh and Orissa), to those from states where grains were not
efﬁciently distributed and the increase in rations had very little effect on actual
PDS consumption (Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh), and to those where the
national reforms resulted in larger PDS consumption, albeit by much less than
in Chhattisgarh (Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra).
The baseline pattern continues to hold for each of these different control
groups. The difference is largest and most precisely estimated when compar-
ing Chhattisgarh to Andhra Pradesh and Orissa (col. 1), where rations were
already larger than the subsidy provided by the central government. How-
ever, consistent with the larger expansion of PDS subsidies in Chhattisgarh
causing larger improvements in nutritional intake, households in Chhattis-
garh had higher growth in protein consumption than border districts from
Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh (col. 2) and higher growth than border districts
from Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra (col. 3).22
Second, table 6 also estimates a slightly modiﬁed speciﬁcation that allows
treatment to vary on the basis of prereform coverage of FPSs. In particular, uti-
lizing the 1999–2000 survey, we proxy for FPS coverage by calculating the
average household PDS rice consumption among households that consume
a positive amount of PDS rice for each district. We deﬁne treatment as the av-
erage percentage difference between the size of the BPL entitlement and aver-
age PDS consumption of those who consume PDS food grains as follows:
Treatmentd
1 2
1=Ndð ÞRNdi51  PDS_Consumptionid ,2,000  Iid ,2,000
Total_BPL_Ration2,000
if   district  d  is  in  Chhattisgarh,
0 otherwise,
8><
>:
where i denotes households, d denotes districts, Nd denotes the total number
of households consuming PDS grains in district d, and I denotes an indicator22 In speciﬁcations not reported, the results are qualitatively identical when we use all of Madhya
Pradesh (the state from which Chhattisgarh was separated) and all of India as the control group.
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Krishnamurthy, Pathania, and Tandon 81function equal to 1 if the household consumes a positive amount of PDS
rice.23
Using this proxy of prereform FPS coverage, we reestimate the baseline
speciﬁcation but replace the interaction of the CT and Post indicators with
the interaction of Treatment and the Post indicator. In this speciﬁcation, we
would expect g > 0 if regions with a worse prereform coverage of FPSs im-
proved their nutrition by more. The estimate is presented in column 4 of ta-
ble 6 and further suggests that nutrition improved the most in districts that
had the largest growth in FPS coverage.24 However, it is important to note that
this proxy is not perfect and that low average PDS consumption among ben-
eﬁciaries might be capturing higher leakage in addition to lack of access to
FPSs.
Third, we provide evidence that our results are not driven by improvements
to other forms of public assistance. A number of other types of public assis-
tance use criteria for eligibility that are similar to the criteria used for the
PDS. These include Food For Work, Annapurna, Integrated Child Develop-
ment Services, and the Midday Meal Schemes, each of which supplies house-
holds with food items andmight alter diet choice. In order to rule out the effect
of changes to these programs, we restrict our sample to households that re-
ceive no other types of public support tracked by the NSSO consumer expen-
diture surveys. Column 5 of table 6 demonstrates that it is unlikely that our
results are an artifact of improvements in other forms of public assistance.
The estimate is nearly identical in magnitude to the baseline estimates in ta-
ble 4 and is more precise.
Fourth, given the delayed implementation of the PDS (Control) Order of
2004, we would expect a larger change in nutrition for households surveyed in
2004 as opposed to those surveyed in 2005 if the change in nutrition was be-
ing caused by an increase in FPSs. We restrict the sample in the postround to
households surveyed in 2004 and 2005 in columns 6 and 7, respectively. Con-
sistent with the changes being caused by the increase in FPS coverage, the
baseline patterns are much stronger in column 6 when we restrict the post-
round to only households surveyed in 2004. Additionally, when we restrict
the postround to households surveyed in 2005 in column 7, the magnitude
of the estimate is smaller and less precisely estimated.23 We chose not to utilize average PDS consumption in a district as a proxy of prereform FPS cov-
erage because it would also capture differences in the share of the population that is below the poverty
line.
24 In speciﬁcations not shown, all results presented in tables 4–9 continue to hold when using this
alternate speciﬁcation as the baseline speciﬁcation, and the estimates are more precisely estimated.
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82 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G EFifth, we provide evidence that our results are not common to all newly
formed states in India. It is possible that newer and smaller states have fewer
entrenched interests and smaller oversight costs. The better overall governance
in these states could improve public services such as the PDS and result in
higher protein consumption. If these factors are decisive, then we should ex-
pect to observe similar patterns of growth in protein consumption in the newly
formed states of Jharkhand and Uttarkhand. These states were formed at the
same time as Chhattisgarh, were also separated from large and relatively poor
states (Bihar and Uttarakhand, respectively), and are approximately the same
size as Chhattisgarh.
Neither Jharkhand nor Uttarakhand, however, had higher growth in pro-
tein consumption than the districts bordering each state. Columns 8 and 9
of table 6 report the differences in growth for Jharkhand and Uttarakhand,
respectively, using the baseline speciﬁcation. The estimate is positive in col-
umn 8 and negative in column 9, the magnitude of each is lower than the
baseline estimates in table 4, and neither is statistically signiﬁcant at conven-
tional levels.
Additionally, table 7 investigates matching methods to estimate the effects
of the PDS reforms in Chhattisgarh on diet choice. One possibility is to utilize
the difference-in-differences matching estimator proposed by Smith and Todd
(2005) and Blundell and Costa-Dias (2000). This estimator is the difference
between the matching estimator in Chhattisgarh and the matching estimator
in border districts, which each uses a Post indicator to deﬁne treatment. The
standard error is calculated with the bootstrap.TABLE 7
MATCHING ESTIMATES OF DIFFERENCES IN PROTEIN CONSUMPTION BETWEEN 1999–2000 AND 2004–5
Dependent Variable: ln(Protein Consumption)
Chhattisgarh
(1)
Border Districts
(2)
Post .050** 2.101***
(.023) (.018)
95% conﬁdence interval .005, .096 2.137, 2.065
Observations 5,088 7,728This content downloaded f
All use subject to University of Chicagorom 139.184.066.135 on November 1
 Press Terms and Conditions (http://wNote. Difference in nongrain consumption between 1999–2000 and 2004–5 for Chhattisgarh and border
districts separately using the matching estimator proposed by Abadie et al. (2004). Estimates use the bias-
corrected and robust options and utilize four matches. Treatment is deﬁned as the Post variable, and con-
trol variables used in the baseline empirical speciﬁcation are the matching variables listed in footnote 17.
Most importantly, the estimated 95% conﬁdence intervals of the two estimates do not overlap.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.0, 2017 07:43:39 AM
ww.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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culated with the bootstrap fail to perform well in even the most simple match-
ing estimator, which suggests that such an estimator might be inappropriate.
We instead use the matching estimator proposed by Abadie et al. (2004) to
estimate treatment separately in Chhattisgarh and border districts, using the
Post indicator to deﬁne treatment and matching on the household-level con-
trol variables in the baseline speciﬁcation. The change in nutrition in Chhat-
tisgarh is presented in column 1 of table 7, and the change in border districts
is presented in column 2. The difference between the two point estimates
suggests that the increase in PDS subsidies in Chhattisgarh improved pro-
tein consumption by approximately 15.1% (the difference between 0.050
and20.101). Although we cannot reliably estimate the standard error of that
difference, the two 95% conﬁdence intervals of the two estimates do not over-
lap, which suggests that, similar to the baseline estimates, protein consump-
tion increased by more in Chhattisgarh than in border districts.
Additionally, in table 8, we estimate how overall expenditure changed in re-
sponse to the increase in food price subsidies. Column 1 estimates the baseline
speciﬁcation utilizing the natural logarithm of total expenditure as the depen-
dent variable, column 2 utilizes the natural logarithm of nonfood expenditure
as the dependent variable, and column 3 utilizes the natural logarithm of food
expenditure as the dependent variable. We ﬁnd little evidence that expendi-
tures changed differently in Chhattisgarh relative to border districts in any
speciﬁcations.TABLE 8
DIFFERENCES IN GROWTH OF EXPENDITURE BETWEEN CHHATTISGARH AND BORDER DISTRICTS
Dependent Variable
ln(Total Monthly Per
Capita Expenditure)
(1)
ln(Total Monthly Per Capita
Nonfood Expenditure)
(2)
ln(Total Monthly Per Capita
Food Expenditure)
(3)
CT  Post .021 .023 .009
(.073) (.074) (.068)
p-value BS .557 .546 .837
p-value RI .571 .429 .571
Observations 12,816 12,816 12,816This cont
All use subject to Univeent downloaded from 
rsity of Chicago Pres139.184.066.135 on Novemb
s Terms and Conditions (httpNote. Difference-in-differences estimate for household expenditure between 1999–2000 and 2004–5.
All speciﬁcations include district ﬁxed effects and control variables. Control variables included are listed
in footnote 17. All speciﬁcations also report p-values of the coefﬁcient on the interaction of the
Chhattisgarh indicator (CT) and a Post variable using the wild cluster bootstrap percentile-t method (p-
value BS) and randomization inference (p-value RI) to estimate standard errors clustered by state. Standard
errors clustered by district are reported in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.er 10, 2017 07:43:39 AM
://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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on consumption. So if a household consumed the same diet before and after
an increase in PDS subsidies, the household would actually spend less on
food. The fact that households did not decrease their food expenditures by
more than neighboring districts suggests that households spent at least some
of the subsidy on more expensive, nutritious foods. This is corroborated by
the increase in nutrition that is the main ﬁnding of the article.25
Finally, we provide evidence that the trends in protein consumption in dis-
tricts that would become Chhattisgarh and border districts were similar be-
fore the PDS reforms in Chhattisgarh. Table 9 demonstrates that growth in
protein consumption only increased in Chhattisgarh relative to border dis-
tricts after the PDS reforms were implemented. Columns 1 and 2 estimate the
baseline speciﬁcation for the growth of protein consumption between 1993
(50th round) and 1997 (53rd round), columns 3 and 4 do so between 1997 and
1998 (54th round), and columns 5 and 6 do so between 1998 and 1999–2000
(55th round). The coefﬁcients in columns 1–6 are all lower in magnitude than
the estimates presented in tables 4–8, and none are statistically signiﬁcant at
conventional levels.
Column 7 of table 9 combines all surveys conducted before the PDS re-
forms (50th, 53rd, and 54th rounds) with the two surveys used in the baseline
analysis (55th and 61st thick rounds) and estimates the difference in protein
consumption growth between Chhattisgarh and border districts for each pe-
riod. The estimate for the period corresponding to Chhattisgarh’s PDS re-
forms (0.193) is similar to the baseline estimate, and there is still little differ-
ence in the growth of protein consumption between Chhattisgarh and border
districts in periods before the PDS reforms. Additionally, despite the lack of
precision of the estimates of the changes in protein consumption before the
reforms in Chhattisgarh, we can reject the hypothesis of all interaction terms
being equal at the 10% level (p 5 .070).
VIII. Conclusion
This article analyzes changes in diet choice in Chhattisgarh relative to border
districts following PDS reforms that dramatically increased the availability of
PDS food grains in the state. We ﬁnd that relative to border districts, house-
holds in Chhattisgarh improved their nutritional intake. These results appear25 We cannot rule out the possibility of households increasing savings as well. After obtaining data on
total bank deposits by district obtained from the Reserve Bank of India, we see that bank deposits
grew by much more in Chhattisgarh than in border districts. Speciﬁcally, total deposits grew by
174% in Chhattisgarh as opposed to 96% in border districts.
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86 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eto be driven by households in Chhattisgarh that were most likely to be entitled
to the largest food subsidies through PDS ration cards. We do not ﬁnd
evidence that households in Chhattisgarh that were the least likely to be en-
titled to PDS subsidies changed their diet relative to households in border dis-
tricts. We also ﬁnd that these changes in nutrient consumption are not a con-
sequence of improvements to other forms of public assistance that target
nutrition.
These results have implications for the recent improvement in PDS deliv-
ery in a number of Indian states (Khera 2011b). Our ﬁndings suggest that this
improvement could have been accompanied by an improvement in protein
consumption. Our results also suggest that the proposed expansion of the
PDS under the NFSA could help to reduce persistent malnourishment and
food insecurity in the country.
The analysis still leaves a number of questions unanswered. We do not
know whether other forms of aid might be more effective at improving nutri-
tion than a large grains subsidy. Other forms of aid include subsidies for more
nutritious foods, food stamps, and even cash subsidies. Although our results
demonstrate that subsidizing staple grains can lead to other nutritional im-
provements, it is possible that direct subsidies for other types of foods may
have a larger effect on nutritional outcomes. Chhattisgarh, in its most recent
PDS reform in 2012, created a statewide subsidy for pulses after implement-
ing a successful pilot program.
This article does not consider the potential adverse effects of PDS procure-
ment of food grains on agricultural markets. Many commentators suggest that
the government-mandated MSP does more to provide income support to
farmers than to stabilize food prices (Rakshit 2003). Some studies suggest that
these interventions in agricultural markets depress investment in the agricul-
tural sector (Parikh, Ganesh-Kumar, and Darbha 2003). The effects of govern-
ment procurement on agricultural markets are likely to be magniﬁed as a result
of increased procurement under the NFSA. A number of policy makers are
therefore concerned about the NFSAs implications for agricultural markets
(Gulati, Gujral, and Nandakumar 2012).
Last, we do not have a deﬁnitive explanation for why the effects of food
assistance on nutrition in this setting differ from other settings. It is possi-
ble that the differences between our results and those of Tarozzi (2005) are
driven by differences in stages of development of the treated populations.
Households in Chhattisgarh are likely to be poorer than those in Andhra
Pradesh. More research is needed to arrive at a deeper understanding of the
generalizability of these results.This content downloaded from 139.184.066.135 on November 10, 2017 07:43:39 AM
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